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Abstract
This paper characterizes the welfare gains from government intervention when the private
sector provides partial insurance. We analyze models in which adverse selection, pre-
existing information, or imperfect optimization in private insurance markets create a role
for government intervention. We derive simple formulas that map existing empirical esti-
mates into quantitative predictions for optimal policy. When private insurance generates
moral hazard, standard formulas for optimal government insurance must be modi￿ed to ac-
count for ￿scal externalities. In contrast, standard formulas are una⁄ected by ￿informal￿
private insurance that does not generate moral hazard. Applications to unemployment
and health insurance show that taking formal private market insurance into account mat-
ters signi￿cantly for optimal bene￿t levels given existing empirical estimates of the key
parameters.
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participants, and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and discussions. Financial support from
NSF Grant SES-0134946 and the Sloan Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.1 Introduction
What is the optimal amount of redistributive taxation and social insurance? A recent liter-
ature in public economics has come closer to providing quantitative answers to this central
policy question. This literature has derived ￿su¢ cient statistic￿formulas that map elasticities
estimated in the modern program evaluation literature into predictions about optimal policies
(e.g., Diamond 1998, Saez 2001, Shimer and Werning 2008, Chetty 2009). One important
limitation of existing su¢ cient statistic formulas is that they do not allow for private market
insurance, implicitly assuming that the government is the sole provider of insurance. In prac-
tice, private markets have historically been an important source of insurance and continue to
remain active today despite the substantial size of social insurance programs.
Previous theoretical and empirical studies have recognized that the existence of private
insurance can lower the optimal level of social insurance.1 However, there is no method of
mapping reduced-form empirical estimates such as those of Cutler and Gruber (1996a) into
quantitative statements about the optimal level of government intervention in models such as
those of Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000) or Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007). This paper takes a
step toward ￿lling this gap. We develop formulas for optimal taxation and social insurance in
stylized models that allow for partial private insurance. The formulas are functions of reduced-
form parameters that are frequently estimated in empirical studies, and can therefore be easily
adapted to analyze policies ranging from optimal tax and transfer policy to unemployment and
health insurance.
The starting point for our analysis is the speci￿cation of the limits of private market insur-
ance and the potential role for government intervention. There are at least ￿ve reasons that
government intervention could improve upon private insurance markets. First, private markets
can only insure against shocks that occur after agents purchase private insurance. Only the
government can provide redistribution across types revealed before private insurance contracts
are signed. Second, informational asymmetries can lead to market unravelling through adverse
selection (Akerlof 1970). Third, even when private markets function perfectly, individuals may
su⁄er from behavioral biases such as myopia or overcon￿dence that lead them to underinsure
1For example, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) make this point theoretically. Cutler and Gruber (1996a-b)
present evidence that crowdout of private insurance is substantial in health care, and argue that this lowers the
optimal level of public health insurance.
1relative to the optimum (Kaplow 1991, DellaVigna 2009, Spinnewijn 2008). Fourth, private
￿rms generally cannot sign exclusive contracts, leading to ine¢ cient outcomes because of mul-
tiple dealing (Pauly 1974). Finally, some studies have argued that the administrative and
marketing costs of private insurance exceed those of public insurance (Woolhandler, Campbell,
and Himmelstein 2003; Reinhardt, Hussey, and Anderson 2004) because of increasing returns
and zero-sum strategic competition. As we discuss in Section 2, these limitations of private
insurance markets may explain the emergence and expansion of social insurance during the
20th century.
In this paper, we characterize the welfare gains from government intervention under the
￿rst three private market limitations.2 We analyze models in which the agent￿ s earnings vary
across states. This variation can be interpreted as uncertainty due to shocks, as in a social
insurance problem, or as variation in earnings ability behind the veil of ignorance, as in an
optimal taxation problem. The model permits suboptimal choice of private insurance ￿e.g.
because of overcon￿dence among individuals ￿as well as market limitations due to pre-existing
information or adverse selection. We derive formulas for the welfare gain from increasing the
government tax rate (or social insurance bene￿t) that depends on ￿ve parameters: (1) the
variation in consumption across states and risk types, (2) the curvature of the utility function,
(3) the elasticity of e⁄ort with respect to the tax or bene￿t rate, (4) the size of the private
insurance market, and (5) the crowdout of private insurance by public insurance. The ￿rst
three parameters are standard elements of su¢ cient statistic formulas for optimal taxation and
social insurance without private insurance; the last two are the new elements. In addition to
o⁄ering a method of making quantitative predictions about welfare gains, our analysis yields
two general qualitative lessons.
First, standard optimal tax and social insurance formulas overstate the optimal degree of
redistribution in the presence of private insurance that generates moral hazard. A planner
may observe substantial income inequality and conclude based on classic optimal tax results
that redistributive taxation would improve welfare. However, if the observed earnings distri-
bution already re￿ ects implicit insurance provided by the private sector ￿e.g. through wage
compression by ￿rms ￿then making the redistribution through taxation could reduce welfare
2We do not consider multiple dealing as it is treated in detail by Pauly (1974). We do not consider adminis-
trative costs in the interest of space. The formulas we develop can be extended to incorporate such costs using
estimates of loading factors for public and private insurance.
2via its e⁄ects on the private insurer￿ s budget. In the extreme case where private insurance
markets function optimally, the planner would end up strictly reducing welfare by implement-
ing such redistributive taxes (Kaplow 1991). Intuitively, the government exacerbates the
moral hazard distortion created by private-sector insurance, and must therefore take into ac-
count the amount of private insurance and degree of crowdout to calculate the optimal policy.
Taking the observed earnings distribution as a re￿ ection of marginal products ￿as is standard
practice both in the theory of optimal taxation and in policy debates ￿may therefore lead to
misleading conclusions about optimal tax policy.
Second, it is critical to distinguish private insurance mechanisms that generate moral haz-
ard from those that do not. While ￿formal￿ arms-length insurance contracts are likely to
generate as much moral hazard as public insurance, ￿informal￿risk sharing arrangements ￿
such as borrowing from close relatives or relying on spousal labor supply to bu⁄er shocks ￿
may involve much less moral hazard. When private insurance does not generate moral haz-
ard, the formula for optimal government bene￿ts coincides exactly with existing formulas that
ignore private insurance completely. This is because the e⁄ect of informal private insurance is
already captured in the smaller consumption-smoothing e⁄ect of public insurance. This point
is of practical importance because most existing empirical studies on private vs. public in-
surance provision do not distinguish between formal and informal private insurance provision
(e.g. Townsend 1994, Cullen and Gruber 2000, Attanasio and Rios-Rull 2000, Schoeni 2002).
To illustrate how our formula can be applied to obtain quantitative predictions about
optimal policy, we present applications to unemployment insurance (UI) and health insurance.
In the unemployment application, we focus on severance pay provided by private employers
as a form of private insurance. Severance pay generates moral hazard because it can induce
workers to shirk on the job, since they do not fully internalize the costs of being laid o⁄. Using
variation in UI bene￿t laws across states in the U.S., we estimate that a 10% increase in UI
bene￿t levels reduces private insurance against job loss (severance pay) by approximately 7%.
Plugging this estimate into our formula along with other parameter estimates from the existing
literature, we ￿nd that there is a wide range of parameters for which standard formulas that
ignore private insurance and crowdout imply that raising the bene￿t level would raise welfare
when in fact it would lower welfare.
Our second application explores the welfare gains from expanding public health insurance
3(e.g. Medicare and Medicaid) using existing estimates of behavioral responses to health insur-
ance. Calibrations of our formula suggest that the aggregate level of public health insurance is
near the optimum given the amount of private insurance and its response to public insurance.
Accounting for private insurance is very important: the standard formula that ignores the
private insurance provision overstates the welfare gain from an aggregate expansion of public
health insurance by a factor of more than 100 with existing elasticity estimates. Note that
these calibration results are based on a representative-agent model with elasticity estimates
for the aggregate population. There are likely to be subgroups of the population that are
underinsured, such as low income individuals, and others that are overinsured. Our analysis
should therefore be interpreted not as a policy recommendation but rather as a call for further
work estimating the key elasticities by subgroup to identify how public health insurance should
be reformed.
This paper builds on and relates to several strands of the literature on optimal insurance.
One theoretical literature has considered optimal insurance and government redistribution
problems jointly (e.g., Blomqvist and Horn, 1984, Rochet, 1991, Cremer and Pestieau, 1996).
These papers analyze models with heterogeneity in ability to earn (as in Mirrlees 1971) coupled
with ex-post shocks to income (such as a health shock). In these models, the government is
the sole provider of insurance, and chooses both an optimal income tax schedule and a social
insurance program.3 In contrast, our paper considers a simpler model with a single source of
earnings heterogeneity, which does not distinguish between risk and ability but allows public
and private insurance to coexist.
Models with private and public insurance have been considered in the literature on optimal
health insurance (e.g., Besley 1989, Selden 1993, Blomqvist and Johansson 1997, Petretto
1999, Encinosa 2003, Barrigozzi 2006). We develop empirically implementable formulas for
the welfare gains from public insurance in such models. Our formulas help to connect the
theoretical work to the corresponding empirical literature on the interaction between private
and public health insurance (e.g., Ginsburg 1988, Taylor et al. 1988, Wolfe and Godderis 1991,
Cutler and Gruber 1996a-b, Finkelstein 2004). The formulas we derive are in the same spirit
as recent su¢ cient statistic formulas in that they shed light on the essential features of the
3An exception is Boadway et al. (2006), who allow for private insurance. However, they assume that private
insurers observe ability while the government does not. In our model, private and public insurers have the
same informational constraints.
4models that matter for welfare analysis. However, unlike typical su¢ cient statistic results,
the formulas we derive here are based on more stylized models and therefore may not be fully
robust to modi￿cations of the primitive structure, an issue that we discuss in greater detail in
the conclusion.
The most closely related paper to our study is that of Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen (2008),
who develop a di⁄erent method of characterizing welfare in a model with adverse selection in
the private insurance market. Einav et al. show that the slopes of the demand and cost curves
for private insurance are together su¢ cient statistics for welfare. Our formula depends instead
on ex-post behavioral responses to change in government bene￿t levels. The two formulas are
complements. Einav et al.￿ s method is easier to implement when exogenous price variation
in insurance markets and demand and cost data are available; our formulas may be easier
to implement when there is variation in government bene￿t levels that permits estimation of
ex-post behavioral responses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief historical
motivation for examining the interaction between social and private insurance. In Section 3,
we consider endogenous private insurance by studying a model in which the government and
private sector have the same tools, but the level of private insurance is not necessarily set
optimally. Section 4 considers a model with market limitations due to the inability of the
private sector to insure pre-existing risks and adverse selection. The applications are presented
in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Private and Social Insurance: Historical Background and
Motivation
To motivate our analysis, we brie￿ y review the history of private insurance schemes that
predated social insurance. We focus on the case of unemployment insurance because it is
one of the oldest forms of both private and social insurance and illustrates the main intuitions
underlying our model.
In the 1800s, private unemployment insurance was most commonly provided by trade
unions. Some trade unions required all union members to pay a fee into a fund in exchange
for receiving a payment from the fund if they were laid o⁄ (International Labor Organization
1955). Some insurance was also provided by social clubs or associations, which pooled risk
5among their members. Neither of these private insurance schemes was very successful, and
they never covered more than a small minority of the workers in an economy. The trade
union insurance only pooled risks within industry. As a result, industry-wide shocks ￿which
were responsible for many layo⁄s ￿could not be handled. The voluntary social clubs su⁄ered
from attracting only those individuals with the highest risk of job loss. This adverse selection
problem led to the demise of many of these clubs.
In view of these problems, municipalities began to introduce voluntary insurance schemes
that were open to anyone in the city. One of the earliest such examples was the voluntary UI
system of Berne, Switzerland, which began in 1893. This system, which was subsidized by the
municipality, o⁄ered a bene￿t of 1 franc per day for individuals who had been out of work for
at least ￿fteen days if they had paid membership dues for six months. The system su⁄ered
from severe adverse selection: for example, factory employees, who had low layo⁄ risk, did
not participate at all despite the generous city subsidy (Willoughby 1897). Authorities also
had di¢ culty in collecting individuals￿dues after they became members, creating substantial
litigation costs.
These limitations of private and voluntary public insurance ￿ problems in pooling risk
across pre-existing types, adverse selection, and administrative costs ￿led to the introduction
of mandatory social insurance programs in the early 1900s. As such social insurance pro-
grams expanded, private insurance schemes became much less prevalent, presumably because
of crowdout (International Labor Organization 1955). Modern developed economies provide
social insurance for unemployment, disability, health, and old age, among other risks. In 1996,
social insurance accounted for 22% of GDP on average in OECD countries (International Labor
Organization 2000).
Despite the dramatic expansion of social insurance over the past century, some private
insurance persists. In the case of unemployment insurance, many ￿rms voluntarily make
severance payments when they lay o⁄ workers (Parsons 2002). In the United States, 62% of
individuals have private health insurance (Gruber 2007). Many countries have private annu-
ity, disability, and life insurance markets.4 In addition to these formal insurance contracts,
￿informal￿private insurance schemes, such as loans from friends and relatives and spousal la-
4See OECD (2008) for statistics on private insurance market shares by country. These numbers must be
interpreted cautiously because even though the insurance is provided by private companies, many countries
have mandatory insurance requirements.
6bor supply, are widespread (Cullen and Gruber 2000). This coexistence of private and public
insurance motivates the question of how public redistribution and insurance programs should
optimally be designed given that private insurance continues to be provided in equilibrium.
The lessons from history discussed above ￿the limitations of private insurance markets and the
crowdout of private insurance by public intervention ￿are the central elements of the model
we use to analyze this question.
3 Optimal Public Insurance with Endogenous Private Insur-
ance
3.1 Setup
We analyze a model in which the government uses taxation or social insurance to redistribute
income across individuals with di⁄erent levels of earnings. Risk averse individuals would like
to insure themselves against the risk of having low income realizations. Following Mirrlees
(1971), we study a ￿hidden skill￿model, in which the uncertainty about output (skill) levels
is resolved before individuals choose e⁄ort. To simplify the analysis, we restrict attention to
optimal linear contracts throughout this paper. In the working paper version Chetty and Saez
(2008), we show that the results proved below in Propositions 1-3 also hold in Varian￿ s (1980)
model of taxation as insurance, in which uncertainty about output is resolved after e⁄ort is
chosen.
Consider an economy with a continuum of individuals of measure one who di⁄er in skill
levels n. Let the distribution of skills be given by a density f(n). An individual of ability
n must work z=n hours to generate output of z. The government imposes a linear tax rate
m on income, which it uses to ￿nance a lump sum grant R. The individual￿ s consumption is
therefore c = (1 ￿ m)z + R. The individual chooses a level of earnings z after he learns his
skill level n, which is private information, to maximize utility
max
z
U(c(z);z;n) (1)
To simplify exposition, we assume the following form for utility in the theoretical section of
the paper:
U(c;z;n) = u
￿
c ￿ h
￿z
n
￿￿
, (2)
7where u(:) is increasing and concave and h(:) is an increasing and convex function that captures
disutility of work. This functional form is convenient because it permits risk aversion while
eliminating income e⁄ects (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Hu⁄man 1988, Diamond 1998). With
this utility speci￿cation, the ￿rst order condition for the agent￿ s choice of z is n(1 ￿ m) =
h0(z=n). The choice of z depends solely on 1 ￿ m and not on R. Let ￿ z =
R
zf(n)dn denote
average earnings in the population and "￿ z;1￿m the elasticity of average earnings ￿ z with respect
to the net-of-tax rate. This behavioral response re￿ ects the moral hazard distortion created
by insurance policies.
We analyze optimal insurance contracts in this model in four steps. First, we characterize
the optimal second-best contract ￿ the optimal policy for a single insurer (government or
private). This is the problem considered in previous studies that developed su¢ cient statistic
formulas for taxation and social insurance (e.g. Saez 2001, Chetty 2006a). Second, we consider
optimal government insurance in the presence of private insurance when private insurance is
not necessarily optimized. Third, we consider the special case when private insurance is
optimized. Finally, we consider a model where private insurance does not generate moral
hazard.
3.2 Second-Best Contract Benchmark
Suppose there is a single insurer who o⁄ers a linear insurance contract with tax rate m behind
the veil of ignorance (i.e., before individuals learn about their ability n). Tax revenue is rebated
as a lump sum grant m￿ z. The insurer chooses m to maximize
W =
Z
u
￿
z ￿ (1 ￿ m) + m￿ z ￿ h
￿z
n
￿￿
f(n)dn (3)
Because z maximizes individual utility, using the envelope theorem, the ￿rst order condition
with respect to m is:
0 =
dW
dm
=
Z
u0(c)￿
￿
(￿ z ￿ z) ￿ m
d￿ z
d(1 ￿ m)
￿
f(n)dn = ￿cov(z;u0)￿
m
1 ￿ m
￿"￿ z;1￿m ￿ ￿ u0￿ ￿ z; (4)
where ￿ u0 =
R
u0 ￿ f(n)dn denotes the average marginal utility and cov(z;u0) denotes the co-
variance between earnings z and marginal utility u0. Equation (4) yields the standard optimal
tax formula:
m
1 ￿ m
=
1
"￿ z;1￿m
￿
￿cov(z;u0)
￿ z ￿ ￿ u0 : (5)
8The formula in (5) can be derived heuristically as follows. Suppose the insurer increases m
by dm. The direct utility cost for individual with earnings z is ￿u0(c) ￿ zdm. The behavioral
response to dm does not generate a ￿rst order e⁄ect on utility because of the envelope theorem.
Therefore, in aggregate, the direct welfare cost is dW = ￿dm
R
u0 ￿ zf(n)dn. The mechanical
increase in tax revenue (ignoring behavioral responses) due to dm is dM = ￿ zdm. The behav-
ioral response in earnings reduces tax revenue by dB = ￿m ￿ d￿ z = ￿ m
1￿m"￿ z;1￿m ￿ ￿ zdm. Hence,
the lump sum grant increases by dM +dB, increasing welfare by ￿ u0 ￿(dM +dB) = ￿ u0 ￿ ￿ z ￿[1￿
m
1￿m"￿ z;1￿m]dm. At the optimum, these e⁄ects must all cancel so that dW +￿ u0￿(dM+dB) = 0,
which yields (5).
3.3 General Case: Private Insurance not Necessarily Optimized
We now turn to the problem of optimal government insurance with endogenous private insur-
ance. We begin by introducing notation to distinguish the private and government insurance
contracts. Let ￿ denote the tax rate chosen by the government and t the tax rate in the private
insurance contract. Private insurance applies to raw output z. We denote by w = (1￿t)z+t￿ z
the net-of-private insurance income. Government taxation applies to the net incomes w, and
we denote by c = (1 ￿ ￿)w + ￿ ￿ w ￿nal disposable income.
Concretely, the private insurer can be thought of as a ￿rm that compresses its wage struc-
ture (w) relative to true marginal products (z) to provide insurance. The government can only
observe earnings, not true underlying marginal products, and hence sets taxes as a function
of w.5
Let m denote the total tax rate on output, de￿ned such that 1 ￿ m = (1 ￿ t)(1 ￿ ￿) and
c = (1 ￿ m)z + m￿ z. If the private insurer and government cooperated to set m to maximize
social welfare, the resulting contract would be identical to that described in the single insurer
setting above. However, in practice private insurers take the government contract ￿ as given
when they choose t. Let t(￿) denote the private insurer￿ s choice of t as a function of the
government tax. In this subsection, we take the function ￿ ! t(￿) as given, and do not
assume that t(￿) is chosen optimally to maximize the agent￿ s expected utility. The level of
private insurance level might not be optimized because of individual failures ￿left to their
5Because the individuals￿e⁄ort decision depends solely on the return net of all taxes (1 ￿ t)(1 ￿ ￿), the
analysis below goes through with no changes if government taxes are levied on the true marginal products z
and private insurance is based on net-of government tax incomes.
9own devices, individuals may purchase too little insurance. For example, individuals could be
too optimistic about the probability they will obtain a high skill level (n). As a result, t(￿)
di⁄ers from the optimal level that would maximize the agent￿ s expected utility in the presence
of overcon￿dence. Let r = ￿dlog(1 ￿ t)=dlog(1 ￿ ￿) denote the empirically observed rate at
which public insurance crowds out private insurance. If r = 0, there is no crowdout. If r = 1,
there is perfect crowdout.
The government chooses ￿ to maximize the agent￿ s expected utility (3), taking into account
the private insurer￿ s response. Let " ￿ w;1￿￿ =
dlog ￿ w
dlog(1￿￿) denote the elasticity of average (post
insurance) earnings ￿ w with respect to 1 ￿ ￿, taking into account the endogenous response of
private insurance t to a change in ￿. The following proposition characterizes the marginal
welfare gain from increasing the tax rate (dW
d￿ ) in terms of empirically estimable elasticities.
Proposition 1. The welfare gain from raising the government tax is
dW
d￿
= ￿(1 ￿ r) ￿ ￿ w
￿￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
+ t
￿
" ￿ w;1￿￿
1 ￿ r
+
cov(w;u0)
￿ w ￿ ￿ u0
￿
(6)
and the optimal tax rate satis￿es
￿
1 ￿ ￿
= ￿t +
1 ￿ r
" ￿ w;1￿￿
￿
￿cov(w;u0)
￿ w ￿ ￿ u0 . (7)
Proof. This problem is identical to (3). Hence, (4) and (5) remain valid. The government sets
￿ so that the total tax rate m satis￿es the standard formula. Because the government does not
observe z directly, it is useful to rewrite (4) and (5) as a function of w instead of z. To do this,
￿rst note that ￿ w = ￿ z and hence " ￿ w;1￿m = "￿ z;1￿m. Second, cov(w;u0) = cov(z(1￿t)+t￿ z;u0) =
(1 ￿ t)cov(z;u0). Third, " ￿ w;1￿￿ = " ￿ w;1￿m ￿ (1 ￿ r) as a one percent increase in 1 ￿ ￿ translates
into a 1￿r percent increase in 1￿m because of crowdout e⁄ects. Similarly, dm
d￿ = (1￿r)(1￿t)
and hence, dW
d￿ = (1 ￿ r)(1 ￿ t)dW
dm. Finally m=(1 ￿ m) = [￿=(1 ￿ ￿) + t]=(1 ￿ t). Using these
expressions, we can rewrite (4) as (6) and (5) as (7). QED.
Proposition 1 shows that private insurance a⁄ects the formula for the optimal tax rate in
two ways. First, the added ￿t term on the right side of (7) re￿ ects the mechanical reduction
in the optimal level of government taxation given the presence of private insurance. Formula
(7) shows that the sum of private and public insurance should be set according to the standard
formula, and hence the optimal ￿ is reduced in proportion to t. The second e⁄ect is that the
10inverse elasticity term is multiplied by 1 ￿ r. Since r > 0, this e⁄ect also makes the optimal
government tax rate smaller. Intuitively, the elasticity relevant for optimal taxation is the
fundamental elasticity of output with respect to total taxes "￿ z;1￿m = " ￿ w;1￿m, which measures
the total moral hazard cost (to both the private and public insurers) of redistributing one dollar
of tax revenue. To recover the fundamental output elasticity in the presence of crowdout, one
must rescale the observed elasticity " ￿ w;1￿￿ by 1
1￿r.6
An important implication of (7) is that if the wage structure already re￿ ects implicit
insurance provided by the private sector, then standard optimal tax formulas that are functions
of the observed wage distributions and wage earnings elasticities are invalid. Intuitively, the
private sector already bears a moral hazard cost for the insurance it provides. The government
exacerbates this pre-existing distortion by introducing additional insurance. Therefore, one
must take into account the amount of private insurance to back out the optimal policy.7
In the simple model considered here, the planner can replicate the second-best optimal
allocation by choosing the level of ￿ that generates the optimal m given the private insurer￿ s
response. The second best can be achieved because private and public insurance are identical
tools in this model: the role for government emerges if private insurance is not set optimally.
When the government and private sector have di⁄erent tools ￿ as in the adverse selection
model analyzed later on￿the second best level of welfare can no longer be achieved.
3.4 Special Case: Optimized Private Insurance
To gain further insight into the e⁄ects of government intervention and connect our results
to the existing literature, we now consider the special case where private insurance is chosen
optimally to maximize expected utility. The following proposition characterizes the e⁄ects of
government intervention on social welfare when private insurance is optimized:
Proposition 2. If private insurance is set optimally,
1) The optimal government tax rate is ￿ = 0 and the welfare cost of introducing a small tax
6Therefore, the crowdout rate r only matters for rescaling the observed elasticity, and plays no fundamental
economic role in the formula. If one could measure the fundamental elasticity " ￿ w;1￿m directly, an estimate of
crowdout would be unnecessary.
7In redistributive taxation applications, it is challenging to measure the private insurance rate t because the
di⁄erence between w and z is not directly observed. Conceptually, one must estimate the di⁄erence between
observed wages and marginal products. In social insurance applications, private insurance typically involves
explicit transfers, and can therefore be measured directly as we shall see in the applications Section.
11￿ is second-order: dW
d￿ (￿ = 0) = 0.
2) Government intervention strictly reduces welfare when ￿ is positive: dW
d￿ (￿ > 0) < 0.
3) The e⁄ect of a tax increase on welfare is given by
dW
d￿
= ￿"￿ z;1￿￿ ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ u0 ￿ ￿ z (8)
where "￿ z;1￿￿ is the elasticity of average earnings with respect to 1￿￿, taking into account the
endogenous response of t to ￿.
Proof.
Optimal Private Contract. In a competitive market where insurers are price takers, the
private insurer takes the government tax rate ￿ and the lump sum grant R = ￿ ￿ w as given
when setting t. Therefore, t is chosen to maximize:
W =
Z
u
￿
z ￿ (1 ￿ t)(1 ￿ ￿) + t(1 ￿ ￿)￿ z + R ￿ h
￿z
n
￿￿
f(n)dn: (9)
Using the envelope condition for individuals￿z, the ￿rst order condition with respect to t is:
0 =
dW
dt
jR;￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
Z
z ￿ u0 ￿ f(n)dn + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ z ￿ ￿ u0 + t(1 ￿ ￿)￿ u0d￿ z
dt
jR;￿: (10)
Because, there are no income e⁄ects, we have "￿ z;1￿tjR;￿ = "￿ z;1￿m, and hence
t
1 ￿ t
=
1
"￿ z;1￿m
￿
￿cov(z;u0)
￿ z ￿ ￿ u0 : (11)
This expression shows that the private insurer follows a rule analogous to the second-best
single insurer choice in (5) in setting t.
E⁄ect of Government Intervention with Optimized Private Insurance. Noting that the
government grant is R = ￿￿ z(1 ￿ m), it follows from (9) that
W =
Z
u
￿
z ￿ (1 ￿ m) + m￿ z ￿ h
￿z
n
￿￿
f(n)dn:
Using the envelope condition for z and the equation dm=d￿ = (1 ￿ t)(1 ￿ r), we obtain
dW
d￿
= (1 ￿ t)(1 ￿ r) ￿ ￿ u0 ￿ ￿ z
￿
￿cov(z;u0)
￿ z ￿ ￿ u0 ￿
m
1 ￿ m
￿ "￿ z;1￿m
￿
:
The ￿rst term in the square bracket can be rewritten using the ￿rst-order-condition in (11) to
obtain
dW
d￿
= (1 ￿ t)(1 ￿ r) ￿ ￿ u0 ￿ ￿ z ￿ "￿ z;1￿m
￿
t
1 ￿ t
￿
m
1 ￿ m
￿
￿
:
12Finally, observing that t=(1 ￿ t) ￿ m=(1 ￿ m) = ￿￿=((1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ t)) and that "￿ z;1￿￿ =
(1 ￿ r)"￿ z;1￿m, we obtain (8) which proves 3). Points 1) and 2) in the proposition follow
immediately from 3). QED.
This proposition shows that the standard lessons of the theory of excess burden apply in
our model: the welfare cost of taxation is proportional to the size of the behavioral response
to taxation and the marginal cost of taxation increases linearly with the tax rate. However,
there is one important di⁄erence relative to the traditional analysis. In standard models of
taxation and social insurance without endogenous private insurance, the deadweight burden
of taxation is an e¢ ciency cost that the government would be willing to trade-o⁄ against the
bene￿ts of more insurance. In the present model, the level of redistribution through market
insurance is already optimal given incentive constraints, and thus the net welfare gain equals
the deadweight burden of taxation. Hence, a benevolent government should do precisely
nothing.
When private insurance markets function optimally, government insurance via taxation or
social insurance strictly reduces welfare because crowdout of private insurance is imperfect.
To understand the intuition, it is helpful to consider an example. Suppose the government
naively thinks it can achieve the second-best optimum by setting ￿ equal to m given by the
standard formula (5). This tax system would achieve the optimum described in Section 3.1
if the private insurance market chose not to provide any insurance. However, zero private
insurance is not the contract that will emerge in an economy with a private insurance market.
Since ￿ < 1, redistribution is incomplete and hence ￿cov(z;u0) > 0, and hence (11) implies
that t > 0, i.e., the private insurer does o⁄er additional insurance. This additional insurance
would increase the expected utility of the agent and the insurance companies would break
even. But the individual and private insurer do not internalize the e⁄ect of their choices on
the government￿ s budget. The added private insurance reduces e⁄ort below the second-best
optimum and hence leads to a lower average output than the government was expecting. As
a result, the government goes into de￿cit and its lump sum grant R needs to be reduced.8
8These results contrast with the analysis of Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007), who argue that government
insurance has no e⁄ect on social welfare in static models because of 100% crowdout. The reason for the
di⁄erence is that Golosov and Tsyvinski study government intervention where the government controls directly
the ￿nal consumption outcomes whereas we consider the e⁄ects of distortionary taxation, which is typically the
nature of policies used in practice.
13We are not the ￿rst to make the point that government intervention is undesirable when
private insurance markets function e¢ ciently. When private insurance is set optimally, the
market equilibrium with no government intervention is information-constrained Pareto e¢ -
cient. Abstractly, it is well known that when the private market equilibrium is constrained
e¢ cient, government price distortions lead to ine¢ ciency (Prescott and Townsend 1984a-b).
Kaplow (1991) makes a similar point about the welfare losses from government intervention in
a simple social insurance model, and Blomqvist and Johannson (1997) and Barrigozzi (2006)
obtain similar results in a model with public and private health insurance. The main con-
tribution of the present paper is to develop formulas for the welfare gains from government
intervention when the private market does not reach the second-best optimum.
Three additional remarks on Proposition 2 deserve mention. First, we expect that the
relationship between the degree of crowdout r and risk aversion will generally have an inverted
U-shape. When individuals are risk neutral (u(c) = c), there is no private insurance (t = 0)
so there is by de￿nition no crowdout (r = 0). At the other extreme, with in￿nite risk aversion
and assuming that the support of z includes zero, cov(z;u0) = ￿￿ z ￿ ￿ u0 and (11) implies that
t=(1￿t) = 1="￿ z;1￿m. If the elasticity does not vary with the net-of-tax rate 1￿m, the private
insurance rate t is independent of ￿. Therefore, in the case of in￿nite risk aversion, there
is also no crowdout. For any interior case with non-zero, ￿nite risk aversion, crowdout will
be positive and incomplete. Hence, government intervention is likely to induce the greatest
welfare losses when risk aversion is very low or very high, because these are the cases in which
crowdout will be small and individuals will end up being most over-insured.
Second, a corollary of Proposition 2 is that in the absence of private market failures, public
goods should be ￿nanced via a uniform lump-sum tax that generates the desired amount of
revenue, even if agents have di⁄erent marginal utilities of income in each state. The private
insurance market will then set redistribution to the optimal level. A distortionary tax to ￿nance
the public good would lead to lower expected utility than a lump-sum tax that generated an
equivalent amount of revenue. This point underscores the substantial e⁄ect that endogenous
private insurance arrangements can have on standard intuitions in the literatures on optimal
taxation and social insurance.
Third, if there are ￿xed administrative costs of setting up an insurance policy, small private
insurers will typically have higher administrative costs per capita than a single social insurance
14scheme. In such an environment, the optimum would be for the government to be the
sole insurance provider. However, because of the e⁄ects discussed in Proposition 2, private
insurers will generally provide positive amounts of insurance in equilibrium even though they
have higher administrative costs than the government. Reaching the second best optimum
therefore requires forbidding private insurance with administrative costs.
3.5 Private Insurance Without Moral Hazard
Thus far, we have considered private insurance contracts that generate the same amount of
moral hazard as public insurance. However, ￿informal￿private risk-sharing mechanisms may
involve less moral hazard. Examples include self insurance through spousal labor supply
or insurance through relatives and neighbors who can monitor e⁄ort. Firms themselves
may provide insurance against shocks that involves less moral hazard by conditioning wage
payments on noisy signals of e⁄ort rather than purely on output. In this section, we explore
how the degree of moral hazard in private insurance a⁄ects our formulas.
When private insurance does not generate moral hazard, reaching the ￿rst-best of full
insurance would be feasible in principle, completely eliminating the role for government inter-
vention. In practice, there are costs of informal insurance ￿such as limits to liquidity, costs of
borrowing from relatives, or relying on spousal labor supply ￿that prevent full insurance. We
model such costs by a loading factor on informal insurance transfers. Informal private insurers
can implement lump sum taxes and transfers Tn to individuals with ability n by paying a
loading cost s(Tn). We assume that s(:) is convex with s(0) = 0 and s(T) > 0 for T 6= 0 to
ensure that the private insurance optimization problem is concave. The government applies a
tax at rate ￿ on net-of-insurance earnings w = z ￿(T +s(T)) and rebates taxes collected with
a lumpsum R = ￿ ￿ w.
Proposition 3. Irrelevance of informal private insurance for optimal social insurance formu-
las. If informal private insurance is optimized, the optimal government tax rate ￿ is given
by
￿
1 ￿ ￿
=
1
" ￿ w;1￿￿
￿
￿cov(w;u0)
￿ w ￿ ￿ u0 (12)
Proof. The private insurer and individuals take ￿ and R = ￿ ￿ w as given, and simultaneously
15choose zn and Tn to maximize
Z
u
h
[zn ￿ (Tn + s(Tn))](1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ h
￿zn
n
￿i
f(n)dn:
subject to the budget constraint
R
Tnf(n)dn ￿ 0. We denote by ￿ the multiplier of this private
insurance constraint. The ￿rst order condition for zn implies that h0(zn=n) = n(1 ￿ ￿), i.e.,
the government tax reduces incentives to work but the amount of informal insurance does not.
The ￿rst order condition for Tn implies that u0(cn)￿(1+s0(Tn))￿(1￿￿) = ￿: marginal utility
is equalized up to the loading factor.
The government chooses ￿ to maximize:
W(￿) =
Z
u
h
[zn ￿ (Tn + s(Tn))](1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ ￿ w ￿ h
￿zn
n
￿i
f(n)dn:
Using the envelope conditions for zn, we have:
dW
d￿
=
Z
u0 ￿
￿
￿w + ￿ w ￿ ￿
d ￿ w
d(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ (1 + s0(Tn))(1 ￿ ￿)
dTn
d￿
￿
f(n)dn
=
￿
￿ ￿ w ￿ ￿ u0 ￿
1 ￿ ￿
" ￿ w;1￿￿ + ￿ w ￿ ￿ u0 ￿
Z
w ￿ u0f(n)dn
￿
￿ ￿
Z
dTn
d￿
f(n)dn;
where the last term is obtained using u0(cn)￿(1+s0(Tn))￿(1￿￿) = ￿. The last term cancels
out as
R
Tnf(n)dn = 0 is constant with ￿. Hence, we obtain again the standard formula (12).
QED.
Why does only private insurance that generates moral hazard change the formulas for
optimal taxation? When private insurance generates moral hazard, the changes in e⁄ort
induced by government intervention have a ￿rst-order externality on the private insurer￿ s
budget and must therefore be taken into account directly in the formula. If private insurance
does not generate moral hazard, the ￿scal externality term disappears because e⁄ort is chosen
jointly with T to optimize W. Thus, the informal insurance mechanisms emphasized in the
structural models of Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2001) and Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez Marcos
(2006) are already taken into account in existing optimal tax and social insurance formulas.
The irrelevance of informal insurance challenges the existing literature, which views crowd-
out of all types of private insurance as reducing the welfare gains from government intervention
equally. Informal insurance reduces the welfare gains from social insurance simply by reducing
16the empirically observed correlation between u0 and w in (12).9 In contrast, formal insurance
reduces this correlation and creates a ￿scal externality, further reducing the welfare gain from
government intervention. It is therefore important to distinguish crowdout of the two types
of private insurance for policy analysis.
4 Failures in Private Insurance Markets
In this section, we extend our formulas to allow for two market failures: pre-existing infor-
mation and adverse selection. Pre-existing information refers to public information about
individuals￿ability before insurance contracts are signed. Adverse selection refers to private
information about individuals￿ability before insurance contracts are signed.
4.1 Pre-Existing Information
We model pre-existing public information as follows. The population is partitioned into K
exogenous groups k = 1;::;K. For instance, the groups could represent health status or region
of birth. Group k contains a fraction pk of the population and has (conditional) density of
abilities fk(n) so that f(n) =
P
k pkfk(n). Group identity is known by both private insurers
and individuals before signing insurance contracts, but the realization of n within a group is
unknown to both insurers and individuals when signing the contract. As a result, private
insurance is o⁄ered within each group k. The private insurer o⁄ers an insurance rate tk
conditional on group k. When there is a single group, this corresponds to the model in
Section 3. At the other extreme, when the number of groups is as large as the number of
individuals, all information is revealed before contracts can be signed and there is no scope for
private insurance contracts. In contrast, the government can impose redistributive taxation
on the entire population.
We assume that the government is restricted to using a uniform tax rate ￿ on earnings.
This is a strong assumption in the present model because the government could potentially
improve welfare by conditioning tax rates on groups, but it is useful to gain insight into the
key features of the problem.10
9This result is consistent with Chetty (2006a), who shows that Baily￿ s (1978) formula is robust to allowing
for arbitrary choices in the private sector as long as they are constrained e¢ cient.
10In practice, horizonal equity considerations appear to prevent the government from using pre-existing public
information such as height, age, family background, or education for tax or redistribution purposes.
17We now introduce notation for the multiple-group case. Let mk denote the total tax rate
in group k such that 1 ￿ mk = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ tk). Individual n in group k optimally chooses
earnings such that h0(z=n) = (1 ￿ mk)n. We denote by ￿ zk =
R
zfk(n)dn average earnings in
group k and by "k =
1￿mk
￿ zk
d￿ zk
d(1￿mk) the elasticity of ￿ zk with respect to 1 ￿ mk. As in Section
3, let w = (1 ￿ tk)z + tk￿ zk denote earnings post private insurance (but before government
taxation). Note that ￿ wk = ￿ zk and ￿ w = ￿ z where ￿ w and ￿ z are the full population means as in
Section 3. Let c = (1 ￿ ￿)w + ￿ ￿ w = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ tk)z + tk(1 ￿ ￿)￿ zk + ￿￿ z denote disposable
income after government taxation.
The crowd-out rate rk of private insurance in group k is 1 ￿ rk = 1￿￿
1￿mk
d(1￿mk)
d(1￿￿) . Note
that this implies that
d(1￿mk)
d(1￿￿) = (1 ￿ tk)(1 ￿ rk) so that we have
dmk
d￿ = (1 ￿ tk)(1 ￿ rk). It
also implies that 1￿￿
1￿tk
d(1￿tk)
d(1￿￿) =
dlog(1￿tk)
dlog(1￿￿) = ￿1 +
dlog(1￿mk)
dlog(1￿￿) = ￿1 + 1 ￿ rk = ￿rk so that we
have
dtk
d￿ = ￿rk
1￿tk
1￿￿ . As above, let " ￿ w;1￿￿ = 1￿￿
￿ z
d￿ z
d(1￿￿) = 1￿￿
￿ w
d ￿ w
d(1￿￿) denote the elasticity of
aggregate earnings with respect to the net-of-government tax rate 1 ￿ ￿, taking into account
crowdout. Note also that, as 1 ￿ rk = 1￿￿
1￿mk
d(1￿mk)
d(1￿￿) , the elasticity of ￿ zk with respect to 1 ￿ ￿
is 1￿￿
￿ zk
d￿ zk
d(1￿￿) = (1 ￿ rk)"k.
We denote by cov(￿ u0
k; ￿ wk) =
P
k pk￿ u0
k[ ￿ wk ￿ ￿ w] the covariance between average marginal
utilities (￿ u0
k) and wages ( ￿ wk) across the K groups. Let covk(u0;w) =
R
u0 ￿ (w ￿ ￿ wk)fk(n)dn
denote the covariance between u0 and w within group k. Finally, in the case where private
insurance does not generate moral hazard, it has the same lump-sum and loading factor design
as in Section 3.5 within each group k.
The government chooses ￿ to maximize social welfare under a utilitarian criterion:
W =
X
k
pk
Z
u
￿
z ￿ (1 ￿ mk) + tk(1 ￿ ￿)￿ zk + ￿￿ z ￿ h
￿z
n
￿￿
fk(n)dn:
The following proposition characterizes the solution to this problem.
Proposition 4
1) In the general case where private insurance is not necessarily optimized, the optimal gov-
ernment tax rate ￿ satis￿es
￿
1 ￿ ￿
= ￿
1
" ￿ w;1￿￿
￿
"
X
k
pk(1 ￿ rk)
covk(u0;w) + "ktk￿ u0
k ￿ ￿ wk
￿ u0 ￿ ￿ w
+
cov(￿ u0
k; ￿ wk)
￿ u0 ￿ ￿ w
#
: (13)
2) When private insurance is optimized within each group, covk(u0;w) + "ktk￿ u0
k ￿ ￿ wk = 0 for
18each k and hence the optimal government tax rate ￿ satis￿es
￿
1 ￿ ￿
= ￿
1
" ￿ w;1￿￿
￿
cov(￿ u0
k; ￿ wk)
￿ u0 ￿ ￿ w
: (14)
3) When private insurance does not generate moral hazard, the optimal government tax rate
￿ follows the standard formula:
￿
1 ￿ ￿
= ￿
1
" ￿ w;1￿￿
￿
cov(u0;w)
￿ u0 ￿ ￿ w
: (15)
Proof: We start with the general case. In the ￿rst order condition with respect to ￿ for the
government, using the envelope condition for individual z, we can ignore the e⁄ects of ￿ on
individual z , so that we have:
0 =
dW
d￿
=
X
k
pk
Z
u0(c)￿
￿
￿z
dmk
d￿
￿ tk￿ zk + (1 ￿ ￿)
dtk
d￿
￿ zk + tk(1 ￿ ￿)
d￿ zk
d￿
+ ￿ z + ￿
d￿ z
d￿
￿
fk(n)dn:
Using
dmk
d￿ = (1￿tk)(1￿rk) and
dtk
d￿ = ￿rk
1￿tk
1￿￿ obtained above, we can rewrite the ￿rst order
condition as:
0 =
X
k
pk
Z
u0(c)￿
￿
￿z ￿ (1 ￿ tk)(1 ￿ rk) ￿ tk￿ zk ￿ rk(1 ￿ tk)￿ zk + tk(1 ￿ ￿)
d￿ zk
d￿
+ ￿ z + ￿
d￿ z
d￿
￿
fk(n)dn:
Re-writing each term (in the same order), and noting that ￿tk￿rk(1￿tk) = (1￿tk)(1￿rk)￿1,
we obtain:
0 =
X
k
pk
￿
￿(1 ￿ tk)(1 ￿ rk)
Z
u0 ￿ z ￿ fk +
￿
[(1 ￿ tk)(1 ￿ rk) ￿ 1]￿ zk ￿ tk(1 ￿ ￿)
d￿ zk
d(1 ￿ ￿)
￿Z
u0 ￿ fk
￿
+
￿
￿ z ￿ ￿
d￿ z
d(1 ￿ ￿)
￿Z
u0 ￿ f(n)dn:
Using the elasticities discussed above, " ￿ w;1￿￿ = 1￿￿
￿ z
d￿ z
d(1￿￿) and "k =
1￿mk
￿ zk
d￿ zk
d(1￿mk), and noting
that 1￿￿
￿ zk
d￿ zk
d(1￿￿) = (1 ￿ rk) ￿ "k, we can rewrite the ￿rst order condition as:
0 =
X
k
pk
￿
(1 ￿ tk)(1 ￿ rk)
￿
￿
Z
u0 ￿ z ￿ fk + ￿ zk ￿
Z
u0 ￿ fk
￿
+ f￿￿ zk ￿ tk(1 ￿ rk) ￿ "k ￿ ￿ zkg
Z
u0 ￿ fk
￿
+
￿
1 ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
" ￿ w;1￿￿
￿
￿ z
Z
u0 ￿ f(n)dn:
Using the average marginal utilities ￿ u0 =
R
u0 ￿ f and ￿ u0
k =
R
u0 ￿ fk, and the covariance
covk(z;u0) =
R
u0 ￿ z ￿ fk ￿ ￿ zk ￿
R
u0 ￿ fk, we obtain:
0 = ￿
X
k
pk(1￿tk)(1￿rk)covk(z;u0)￿
X
k
pk￿ u0
k￿￿ zk￿
X
k
pk￿ u0
k￿￿ zk￿tk(1￿rk)"k+￿ u0￿￿ z￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿" ￿ w;1￿￿￿￿ u0￿￿ z
19Re-ordering terms, we obtain:
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿" ￿ w;1￿￿￿￿ u0￿￿ z = ￿ u0￿￿ z￿
X
k
pk￿ u0
k￿￿ zk￿
X
k
pk(1￿tk)(1￿rk)covk(z;u0)￿
X
k
pk￿ u0
k￿￿ zk￿tk(1￿rk)"k:
Note that ￿ z = ￿ w, ￿ zk = ￿ wk, and covk(w;u0) = (1 ￿ tk)covk(z;u0). Hence, using cov(￿ u0
k; ￿ wk) =
P
k pk￿ u0
k ￿ wk ￿ ￿ u0 ￿ ￿ w, we ￿nally obtain:
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿ " ￿ w;1￿￿ ￿ ￿ u0 ￿ ￿ w = ￿cov(￿ u0
k; ￿ wk) ￿
X
k
pk(1 ￿ rk)[covk(w;u0) + "ktk￿ u0
k ￿ ￿ wk];
which demonstrates (13).
When the private insurer sets tk optimally, it takes ￿ and R = ￿￿ z as given and chooses tk
to maximize
Z
u
￿
z ￿ (1 ￿ tk)(1 ￿ ￿) + tk(1 ￿ ￿)￿ zk + R ￿ h
￿z
n
￿￿
fk(n)dn:
This is the same problem as in Section 3.4 and the ￿rst order condition leads to the same
formula:
tk
1 ￿ tk
=
￿covk(z=￿ zk;u0=￿ u0
k)
"k
;
which can be rewritten as tk"k = ￿covk(w= ￿ wk;u0=￿ u0
k). Therefore, the ￿rst term in the square
bracket expression in (13) vanishes, yielding the simpler formula (14).
If there is no moral hazard in the private insurer choice, then, as in Section 3.4, lumpsum
transfers Tk
n and zn are chosen simultaneously to maximize
Z
u
h
[zn ￿ (Tk
n + sk(Tk
n))](1 ￿ ￿) + R ￿ h
￿zn
n
￿i
fk(n)dn:
subject to the budget constraint
R
Tk
nfk(n)dn ￿ 0 (with multiplier ￿k). The ￿rst order con-
dition for Tk
n implies that u0(ck
n) ￿ (1 + s0
k(Tk
n)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) = ￿k. The government chooses ￿ to
maximize:
W(￿) =
X
k
pk
Z
u
h
[zn ￿ (Tk
n + sk(Tk
n))](1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ ￿ w ￿ h
￿zn
n
￿i
fk(n)dn:
Using the envelope conditions for zn and noting that wn = zn ￿ (Tk
n + sk(Tk
n)), we have:
dW
d￿
=
X
k
pk
Z
u0 ￿
￿
￿w + ￿ w ￿ ￿
d ￿ w
d(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ (1 + s0
k(Tk
n))(1 ￿ ￿)
dTk
n
d￿
￿
fk(n)dn
= ￿ ￿ w ￿ ￿ u0
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
" ￿ w;1￿￿ + cov(w= ￿ w;u0=￿ u0)
￿
￿
X
k
pk￿k
Z
dTk
n
d￿
fk(n)dn
20The last term cancels out as
R
Tk
nfk(n)dn = 0 for each k and any value of ￿, yielding (15).
QED.
Note that the three points in Proposition 4 nest exactly the results obtained in Propositions
1, 2, 3 in the special case where K = 1, i.e. when there is no pre-existing information.
Equation (13) shows that the welfare gain from government intervention in this more general
model consists of two elements: (1) increased insurance within groups, which is captured by
parameters analogous to those analyzed in the baseline case, and (2) increased insurance across
groups, which re￿ ects the gains from pooling risk across types. In the present model, (1) only
is operative if private insurance is not optimized; if it was, this term would be zero and only
the second term is operative.
When private insurance is optimized, the optimal tax rate follows a modi￿ed formula where
individuals in group k are treated as a single individual with marginal utility and earnings
equal to the average in group k. Intuitively, private insurance takes care of within group
insurance as well as the government could. Therefore, the government should focus solely on
redistribution across groups, which cannot be insured by the private sector because of pre-
existing information. Finally, (15) shows that the government can again ignore ￿informal￿
private insurance that does not generate moral hazard and apply the standard optimal tax
formula.
4.2 Adverse Selection
Now suppose that each individual knows which group he belongs to before signing insurance
contracts, but insurers do not have this information. This model is an extension of the classic
adverse selection models proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977). If
private insurers were to o⁄er a menu of competitive insurance contracts with insurance rates
(t1;::;tM), individuals in group k would self-select the insurance rate that yields the highest
expected utility and private insurers would make negative pro￿ts. Hence, private insurers are
forced to adjust contracts to respect incentive compatibility constraints. A strong equilibrium
is de￿ned as a set of contracts such that no ￿rm can make positive pro￿ts by o⁄ering a new
insurance contract. When such strong equilibria exist, they are always separating in the sense
that each group k selects a single and speci￿c insurance rate tk (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976).
21When such strong equilibria do not exist, it is necessary to weaken the concept of equilibrium
to obtain existence of an equilibrium (Wilson 1977).
Here, we restrict attention to the region of the parameter space where an equilibrium exists.
In this equilibrium, each group k is o⁄ered private insurance at tax rate tk. The tk can be
common across some groups if there is partial pooling. Furthermore, the tk depend on the
government tax rate ￿. Assume that the tk are smooth functions of ￿ so that crowdout rates
rk are well de￿ned and welfare gains are smooth.11 The revelation principle implies that in
equilibrium each individual will truthfully reveal his type k. Hence, the equilibrium in this
model can be viewed as a special case of the pre-existing information model analyzed above,
where private insurance contracts were set arbitrarily. It follows that the general formula (13)
in Proposition 4 holds in this environment.
Adverse selection does, however, a⁄ect the formula with optimized private insurance (14)
because it distorts the provision of private insurance within groups. This leads to a violation
of the within-group private insurance optimality condition t￿
k = ￿covk(w= ￿ wk;u0=￿ u0
k)="k. To
obtain further intuition, rewrite (13) as:
￿
1 ￿ ￿
= ￿
1
" ￿ w;1￿￿
￿
cov(￿ u0
k; ￿ wk)
￿ u0 ￿ ￿ w
+
1
" ￿ w;1￿￿
￿
X
k
pk(1 ￿ rk)"k ￿ (t￿
k ￿ tk) ￿
￿ u0
k ￿ ￿ wk
￿ u0 ￿ ￿ w
, (16)
where t￿
k is the optimal private insurance rate in the absence of adverse selection constraints.
There are two components in (16). The ￿rst term re￿ ects the value of redistribution across
the groups, as in (14). The second term re￿ ects the value of ￿xing the distortions created by
adverse selection within each group. Typically, adverse selection leads to under-provision of
private insurance: tk < t￿
k (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). Hence, there is value to increasing
within-group redistribution even if private contracts are optimized in the presence of adverse
selection.
More generally, (16) implies that the government tax rate ￿ should be higher than in the
case with no adverse selection (14) because it ￿xes two market failures rather than one.
11In cases with multiple equilibria, this assumption requires that the allocation never jumps across equilibria
following a small change in ￿.
225 Empirical Applications
We now apply the formula in Proposition 1 to characterize the welfare gains from expanding
unemployment and health insurance programs in the United States. These calibrations are
intended primarily to illustrate the potential impacts of endogenous private insurance on cal-
culations of welfare gains from government intervention rather than for policy analysis. These
simple calculations do not account for all margins of behavioral responses and for heterogeneity
across individuals.
Because social insurance problems typically involve two states ￿ e.g. employment and
unemployment ￿we ￿rst adapt the analysis above to an environment where agents choose
between two levels of income. We then show that the formulas derived above can be expressed
in terms of the parameters estimated in existing empirical studies of social insurance in this
extensive-margin model.
5.1 Welfare Gain from Social Insurance
We consider the general model in (1), but from this point forward assume that there are
only two feasible earnings levels: z 2 fzL;zHg. For consistency with the prior literature on
unemployment and health insurance, we use a separable utility speci￿cation in the empirical
applications:
U(c;z;n) = u(c) ￿ h(z=n).
In the binary earnings model, insurance contracts can be characterized by a premium (or tax)
that agents pay insurers when earnings are high in exchange for a bene￿t (or transfer) that
insurers pay agents when earnings are low. Before agents realize their value of n, they sign
contracts with a private insurer who charges a tax ￿p if the agent has high earnings (zH) and
pays a transfer bp if he has low earnings. All agents hold the same private insurance contract
(￿p;bp) because there are no ex-ante di⁄erences across individuals. The government charges a
tax ￿ to ￿nance a public insurance system and pays a transfer b if the agent has low earnings.
With this notation, an individual works to obtain high earnings zH i⁄n > n￿ where n￿ satis￿es
u(zH ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿p) ￿ u(zL + b + bp) = h(zH=n￿) ￿ h(zL=n￿):
23The social welfare function aggregates utility over the continuum of agents in the economy:
W =
Z n￿
0
[u(zL + b + bp) ￿ h(zL=n)]dF(n) +
Z 1
n￿
[u(zH ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿p) ￿ h(zH=n)]dF(n):
Let the fraction of agents who have high earnings zH be denoted by
e = 1 ￿ F(n￿) =
Z 1
n￿
dF(n):
Let F￿1 denote the inverse of F. Then n￿ = F￿1(1 ￿ e) and we can write social welfare as
W(e) = eu(zH ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿p) + (1 ￿ e)u(zL + b + bp) ￿  (e);
where
 (e) =
Z 1
0
h(zL=n)dF(n) +
Z 1
F￿1(1￿e)
[h(zH=n) ￿ h(zL=n)]dF(n);
is the aggregate disutility from working at the higher earnings level. In this model, the
fraction of agents who work (e) is e⁄ectively chosen to maximize W, taking the government
and private insurance contracts as given. The aggregate economy is isomorphic to standard
social insurance models (e.g. Baily 1978), where the individual controls his probability of being
in the low earnings state by choosing e⁄ort e.
Let "1￿e;B denote the elasticity of the probability of the low state (1 ￿ e) with respect
to the total bene￿t level, B = b + bp. The private insurance bene￿t level bp depends on
the government bene￿t b according to a function bp(b), which may not necessarily be set
optimally. For example, suppose individuals perceive their ex-ante probability of having a skill
level n > n￿ as e+￿ where ￿ measures the individual￿ s degree of overcon￿dence. Spinnewijn
(2008) shows that when ￿ > 0, the private market equilibrium yields bp below the second-best
level of B.12 The formula below nests the case with ￿ > 0.
Because the bene￿ts are additive rather than multiplicative, it is convenient to de￿ne the
crowdout parameter as r = ￿
dbp
db for the social insurance applications. With endogenous
private insurance, the government chooses b to maximize
W = eu(zH ￿
1 ￿ e
e
(bp(b) + b)) + (1 ￿ e)u(zL + bp(b) + b) ￿  (e). (17)
12Spinnewijn (2008) analyzes private insurance and social insurance separately in a model with biased beliefs.
He does not consider the optimal level of social insurance with endogenous private insurance as we do here.
In Spinnewijn￿ s terminology, our analysis permits ￿baseline￿optimism but not ￿control￿optimism because the
latter would distort e⁄ort choices.
24The following proposition is the analog of Proposition 1 for this binary earnings model.
Proposition 5. The welfare gain from raising the government social insurance bene￿t is:
dW
db
= (1 ￿ e)(1 ￿ r) ￿ u0(cH) ￿
￿
u0(cL) ￿ u0(cH)
u0(cH)
￿ 1 ￿
"1￿e;b
e
￿
1 + bp=b
1 ￿ r
￿
. (18)
Proof. It is straightforward to establish that  (e) is an increasing and convex function of
e.13 Therefore, e is e⁄ectively set at an interior optimum by agents. As noted in section
3.3, choosing b is equivalent to choosing the total bene￿t B. Di⁄erentiating (17) yields
dW
dB = (1￿e)u0(cH)
h
u0(cL)￿u0(cH)
u0(cH) ￿
"1￿e;B
e
i
. Observe that dW=db = dW=dB￿(1￿r). Likewise,
de=db = de=dB￿(1￿r) and thus "1￿e;B = ￿(b+bp)(de=dB)=(1￿e) = (1+bp=b)￿"1￿e;b=(1￿r).
Plugging these expressions into the expression for dW
dB yields (18). QED.
The ￿rst term in (18) measures the gap in marginal utilities across the two states, which
captures the marginal value of insurance. The second term captures the cost of insurance
through the behavioral response. Analogous to the tax scenario, private insurance ampli￿es
the second term and makes dW
db smaller through two channels: the crowdout e⁄ect 1￿r in the
denominator and the mechanical e⁄ect bp=b in the numerator. The crowdout term re￿ ects a
rescaling to recover the fundamental elasticity "1￿e;B and the bp=b term re￿ ects the reduction
in b required to achieve the optimal level of B.
The expression for dW
db measures the marginal welfare gain of changing social insurance
bene￿ts in utils. To convert this expression into an interpretable money metric, we normalize
the welfare gain from a $1 (balanced budget) increase in the size of the insurance program by
the welfare gain from raising the wage bill in the high state by $1:
G(b) =
dW
db
1
1 ￿ e
=
dW
dzH
1
e
(19)
= (1 ￿ r)
￿
u0(cL)
u0(cH)
￿ 1 ￿
"1￿e;b
e
1 + bp=b
1 ￿ r
￿
(20)
5.2 Application 1: Unemployment Insurance
The existing literature on optimal unemployment insurance essentially ignores private insur-
ance. Most private insurance against unemployment is provided through informal risk sharing
13Note that  
0(e) = ￿
dF￿1(1￿e)
de [h(zH=n
￿) ￿ h(zL=n
￿)]f(n
￿) = h(zH=n
￿) ￿ h(zL=n
￿) > 0 as zH > zL. We
have dn
￿=de = ￿1=f(n
￿), hence  
00(e) = [(zH=n
￿)h
0(zH=n
￿) ￿ (zL=n
￿)h
0(zL=n
￿)]=[n
￿f(n
￿)] > 0 as h
0(:) is
increasing.
25that is unlikely to generate much moral hazard, and hence can be ignored in the calculation
of optimal bene￿ts according to the results in section 3.5. However, many US private ￿rms
provide unemployment insurance in the form of severance payments ￿lump sum cash grants
made by ￿rms to workers who are laid o⁄. Unlike government-provided unemployment ben-
e￿ts, severance pay does not distort job search behavior after job loss because it does not
a⁄ect marginal incentives to search. Severance pay can, however, distort e⁄ort choices while
working by changing the relative price of being unemployed relative to having a job.
In this section, we calibrate the welfare gain from raising the UI bene￿t level when the
response of severance pay to UI bene￿ts is taken into account. To map the optimal UI problem
into the static framework in section 5.1, we ignore the job search decision, treating search e⁄ort
after job loss as invariant to the UI bene￿t level. Instead, we focus on the distortion in the
probability of job loss (e.g. due to shirking) caused by UI bene￿ts and severance pay. In our
static model, both UI bene￿ts and severance pay act as transfers to the unemployed state, and
are ￿nanced by taxes in the employed state.14 Employed agents earn zH > 0 and unemployed
agents earn zL = 0. An agent with ability n must pay an e⁄ort cost h(zH=n) to keep his job.
The formula in Proposition 1 can be directly applied to this environment with the following
empirical analogs for its arguments: the fraction of agents who are unemployed is 1 ￿ e; the
elasticity of the probability of job loss with respect to the UI bene￿t level is "1￿e;b; and cH
and cL are consumption when employed and unemployed, respectively; and r measures the
crowdout of severance pay (bp) by government UI bene￿ts (b).
Estimation of Crowdout Elasticity. As an illustration of the data and empirical strategy
needed to implement our formula with endogenous private insurance, we begin by estimating
the two key parameters ￿the size of the private insurance market (bp=b) and the crowdout e⁄ect
(r). To do so, we use data on severance pay from a survey conducted by Mathematica on behalf
of the Department of Labor. The dataset (publicly available from the Upjohn Institute) is a
sample of unemployment durations in 25 states in 1998 that oversamples UI exhaustees. We
reweight the data using the sampling weights to obtain estimates for a representative sample
of job losers. The dataset contains information on unemployment durations, demographic
characteristics, and an indicator for receipt of severance pay. There are 3,395 individuals in
14A more precise calibration would take account of the fact that UI bene￿ts are conditioned on duration, and
thus are larger when a worse ￿state￿is realized. This calibration would require separate estimates of the e⁄ect
of UI bene￿ts and severance pay on the probability of job loss.
26the sample, of whom 508 report receiving a severance payment. See Chetty (2008) for further
details on the dataset and sample construction.
To calculate bp=b, ￿rst note that 15% of job losers report receiving severance pay in our
data. According to calculations reported in Chetty (2008), the mean severance payment
conditional on receipt of severance pay is equal to 10.7 weeks of wages, the mean UI bene￿t
level is 50% of the wage, and the mean unemployment duration is 15.8 weeks. Hence, in the
aggregate population, the ratio of total private insurance to total public insurance is
bp
b
=
0:15 ￿ 10:7
0:5 ￿ 15:8
= 0:20:
To estimate r ￿the e⁄ect of an increase in the UI bene￿t level on severance pay ￿we exploit
variation in UI bene￿t levels across states. An OLS regression of severance pay receipt on
individual UI bene￿t levels is unlikely to yield a consistent estimate of r because individuals
with higher wages have a higher probability of receiving severance pay and higher UI bene￿ts
(Lee Hecht Harrison 2001, Chetty 2008). We account for the counfound created by wage
heterogeneity across individuals in two ways. First, we isolate policy-driven in UI bene￿ts
by instrumenting for individual bene￿ts with the maximum bene￿t level in their state. Most
states pay a ￿xed wage replacement rate up to a maximum, which varies considerably across
states and thereby creates variation in UI bene￿t levels. Second, we control for individual
wages ￿ exibly throughout our analysis using a 10 piece spline for the individual log wage. The
speci￿cations we estimate are analogous to those of Meyer (1990), with severance pay receipt
rather than unemployment durations as the dependent variable.
We begin with a simple graphical analysis to illustrate the estimation of the crowdout e⁄ect.
Figure 1 plots the relationship between average severance pay receipt and the maximum UI
bene￿t level, conditioning on wages. To construct this ￿gure, we ￿rst regress the severance
pay dummy on the individual wage spline and the maximum UI bene￿t level on the wage
spline and compute residuals. We then compute mean residuals of both variables by state.
The ￿gure is a scatter plot of the mean residuals. We exclude states that have fewer than 50
individuals from this ￿gure to reduce the in￿ uence of outliers on the graph; all observations
are included in the regression analysis below. The ￿gure shows that states with higher UI
bene￿t levels have fewer severance payments, indicating that private insurance is crowded out
to some extent by public insurance.
27To quantify the amount of crowdout, we estimate regression models of the following form:
sevi = ￿ + ￿logbi + f(wi) + ￿Xi + "i (21)
where sevi is an indicator for whether individual i received a severance payment, bi is a measure
of the UI bene￿t level for individual i, f(wi) denotes the wage spline, and Xi denotes a vector
of additional controls.
Speci￿cation 1 of Table 1 reports estimates of (21) without any additional controls X, with
bi equal to the maximum bene￿t level in the state where individual i lives. Standard errors
in this and all subsequent speci￿cations are clustered by state to adjust for arbitrary within-
state correlation in errors. The estimated coe¢ cient of ￿ = ￿0:075 implies that doubling the
UI bene￿t maximum would reduce the fraction of individuals receiving severance pay by 7
percent. Speci￿cation 2 replicates 1 with the following individual-level covariates: job tenure,
age, gender, household size, education, dropout, industry, occupation, and race dummies.
The point estimate on the UI bene￿t level is not a⁄ected signi￿cantly by the inclusion of these
controls.
Speci￿cations 1 and 2 are reduced form regressions which show the e⁄ect of the instrument
(maximum bene￿t levels) on severance pay. To obtain an estimate of the e⁄ect of a $1
increase in the bene￿t level on the probability of severance pay receipt, we estimate a two-
stage least squares regression, instrumenting the log individual bene￿t level with the log state
maximum. The estimated coe¢ cient on the log individual bene￿t, reported in column 3 of
Table 1, is ￿ = ￿0:105. Doubling the UI bene￿t level would reduce severance receipt by 10.5
percentage points, relative to a mean value of 15%, implying "bp;b = ￿0:7. We conclude that
r = ￿
dbp
db = ￿"bp;b
bp
b = 0:7 ￿ 0:2 = 0:14.
The identi￿cation assumption underlying these regressions is that the cross-state variation
in UI bene￿t maximums is orthogonal to other determinants of severance pay receipt condi-
tional on wage levels. Most plausible endogeneity stories would work toward attenuating our
estimate of the crowdout e⁄ect. For example, suppose states with higher UI bene￿t maxi-
mums are populated by individuals who are more risk averse and therefore place higher value
on insurance. Such states would also have higher private insurance, biasing downward our
crowding out estimate. Given these concerns about policy endogeneity, our simple empirical
analysis should be viewed as illustrative. Future work should exploit within-state variation
28in UI bene￿ts to obtain a more credible and precise estimate of the crowdout e⁄ect.
Calibration. We calibrate (20) to calculate the marginal welfare gain of public UI using
the following inputs drawn from the empirical literature on unemployment insurance and the
estimates above:
e = 0:95 from CPS statistics (5% unemployment rate)
r = ￿
dbp
db
= 0:14 from calculations above
bp
b
= 0:2 from calculations above
ce
cu
=
1
0:9
from Gruber (1997)
￿ = 2 from Chetty (2006b)
Under the approximation that utility exhibits constant relative risk aversion between cu and
ce,
u0(cu)
u0(ce) = ( 1
0:9)￿ where ￿ denotes the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. The remaining
parameter, for which we have no existing estimate, is "1￿e;b ￿the elasticity of the probability
of job loss with respect to the UI bene￿t level b. Leaving this parameter unspeci￿ed and
plugging in the remaining values into the formula for dW
db , we obtain
G(b) = (1 ￿ 0:14)(0:23 ￿ 1:47"1￿e;b).
It follows that if the job loss elasticity "1￿e;b > 0:15, dW
db < 0 at present UI bene￿t levels when
crowdout is taken into account. In contrast, if we were to apply a formula that does not take
crowdout of private insurance into account, we would obtain
G(b) = (0:23 ￿ 1:05"1￿e;b).
Hence, an analyst who ignores crowdout would conclude that the welfare gain from raising
the UI bene￿t level is negative only if "1￿e;b > 0:25 (ignoring distortions in unemployment
durations). We conclude that in this application, there is a signi￿cant but modest range of
parameters for which adjusting the formula for endogenous private insurance leads to di⁄erent
policy implications.
5.3 Application 2: Health Insurance
A Model of Health Shocks. To adapt the model of social insurance in section 5.1 to health
insurance, consider an economy with a continuum of ex-ante identical agents, each of whom
29has utility u(c) when healthy and u(c)￿v when sick. By purchasing health care, which costs
$C, an agent who is sick can return to the healthy state and erase the utility cost v. Both
sick and healthy individuals earn a ￿xed income z. In this setting, v measures the agent￿ s
gross valuation of health care. The valuation of health care v is distributed according to a
smooth cdf F(v).
The structure of insurance contracts is the same as above: insurers collect premia from
￿healthy￿individuals who choose not to purchase health care and pay (net of premium) bene￿ts
to individuals who do purchase health care. An agent buys health care i⁄ u(z ￿C +b+bp) >
u(z ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿p) ￿ v, i.e., i⁄ v > v￿, where
v￿ = u(z ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿p) ￿ u(z ￿ C + b + bp)
Letting the fraction of agents who do not buy health care be denoted by e = F(v￿), we can
write social welfare as
W(e) = eu(z ￿
1 ￿ e
e
(bp(b) + b)) + (1 ￿ e)u(z ￿ C + bp(b) + b) ￿  (e) (22)
where  (e) =
R F￿1(e)
0 vdF is the aggregate utility gain from consumption of health care. The
government chooses b to maximize (22), a problem that is identical to (17) with zH = z
and zL = z ￿ C. Therefore, the formula in Proposition 1 can be applied to calculate dW
db
with the following empirical analogs for its arguments: the fraction of agents who purchase
health care is 1 ￿ e; the elasticitity of health care utilization with respect to the government
insurance bene￿t is "1￿e;b; cH and cL are consumption when healthy and sick, respectively;
and r measures the crowdout of private health insurance (bp) by public health insurance (b).
Calibration. We calibrate (20) to calculate the marginal welfare gain of public health insurance
using the following inputs drawn from the empirical literature on health insurance:
"1￿e;C = ￿0:2 from Manning et al. (1987)
1 ￿ e = 0:1 from Manning et al. (1987) for inpatient usage rate
r = ￿
dbp
db
= 0:5 from Cutler and Gruber (1996a)
bp
b
= 0:89,
b
C
= 0:45 from National Health Care Statistics Table 6 (2006)
ce
cu
=
1
0:85
from Cochrane (1991)
￿ = 2 from Chetty (2006b)
30Under CRRA utility, these parameters imply that
u0(cu)
u0(ce) = ( ce
cu)￿ = ( 1
0:85)2 = 1:384. Also note
that "1￿e;b = ￿"1￿e;C
b
C = 0:2 ￿ :45 = 0:09. Hence
G(b) = (1 ￿ 0:5) ￿ (0:384 ￿
0:2 ￿ :453
0:9
1 + 0:89
0:5
) = 0:0017
If we had ignored crowdout, we would have obtained
G(b) = (0:384 ￿
0:2 ￿ :453
0:9
) = 0:28
Taking crowdout into account lowers the estimate of G(b) by a factor of more than 100. An
analyst who ignored crowdout and applied existing formulas (e.g. Chetty 2006a) would infer
that a $1 million expansion in public health insurance programs would generate $280,000 in
surplus net of the required tax increase needed to ￿nance the expansion. This analyst would
mistakenly conclude that an expansion in the overall level of public health insurance would
yield substantial welfare gains. Taking crowdout into account implies that we are near the
optimum in terms of aggregate public health insurance levels, as a $1 million across-the-board
expansion would generate only $1,700 in net social surplus.
There are several important caveats to this calibration that should be kept in mind when
evaluating the policy implications of this simple calibration. First, this calculation does not
fully account for pre-exsting information and adverse selection, as it neglects the bene￿ts of
redistributing across pre-existing risk types via government insurance re￿ ected in the ￿rst term
of (16). Second, the calibration ignores the correlation between health shocks and income
inequality, which could potentially increase the welfare gains from health insurance (Cremer
and Pestieau 1996). Third, private health insurance bene￿ts are already tax subsidized in the
United States. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, our aggregate welfare gain calculation
ignores substantial heterogeneity across types of people, conditions, Medicare vs. Medicaid,
etc. For some subgroups, such as the uninsured, there could clearly be substantial welfare
gains from increasing public insurance bene￿ts whereas for others there could be substantial
welfare gains from cutting bene￿ts.
6 Conclusion
This paper has characterized the welfare gain from public insurance in the presence of endoge-
nous private insurance. The formulas for optimal tax and social insurance policies derived
31here highlight two general parameters as the determinants of how private insurance impacts
the welfare gains from social insurance: (1) the size of the formal private insurance market and
(2) the crowdout of formal private insurance by public insurance. The crowdout and size of
informal insurance ￿that is, insurance that does not generate moral hazard ￿does not enter
the formulas. It is therefore crucial to distinguish between formal and informal insurance
empirically.
Like recent ￿su¢ cient statistic￿formulas for welfare analysis, the formulas we have derived
can be implemented using reduced-form empirical evidence without full identi￿cation of the
model￿ s primitives. However, unlike existing formulas in models without private insurance,
we are unable to obtain a single formula that is robust across a range of models. In models
with endogenous private insurance, the source of the deviation from constrained e¢ ciency ￿
e.g. asymmetric information, imperfect optimization, or formal vs. informal private insurance
￿a⁄ects the formula. We believe that the parameters we have identi￿ed are likely to matter
in more general models, but other factors may also be relevant.
Our theoretical analysis can be generalized in three broad directions. First, one should
characterize the e⁄ects of government intervention on the equilibria in the adverse selection
model, as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977). We have implicitly assumed
that contracts and behavior will respond smoothly to changes in government policies, but in a
setting with multiple equilibria, there could be jumps between equilibria that would invalidate
our formula. Second, it would be useful to extend the analysis to allow for di⁄erent load-
ing factors for private and public insurance, micro-founded via increasing returns or wasteful
marketing costs. Conversely, one could allow for di⁄erent levels of e¢ ciency, re￿ ecting the
possibility that private insurers could be more e¢ cient because of competitive pressure. Fi-
nally, in the simple model we analyzed here, the best policy is simply to rule out formal
private insurance and have the government provide all insurance. However, there are some
areas in which private insurers have an informational advantage relative to the government.
For instance, employers have more information on e⁄ort on the job, making the moral hazard
problem smaller for the employer. Characterizing the optimal mix of government and private
insurance is an important next step.
If government and private insurers optimize along the lines described by our analysis, our
model makes testable predictions about the pattern of insurance contracts we should observe.
32For instance, private insurance should be more prevalent in economies with low job mobility
(such as Japan), where ￿rms have the ability to insure shocks through a compressed wage
structure without facing as much adverse selection. Another prediction is that government
insurance should be more prevalent for shocks that occur prior to the point at which insurance
contracts can be purchased, such as disability at birth, or for shocks where optimization of
insurance purchases is unlikely. It would be interesting to test empirically whether observed
contracts match these theoretical prescriptions.
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Figure 1
Effect of UI Benefits on Severance Pay
NOTE–Figure plots relationship between fraction of individuals receiving
severance pay in each state vs. maximum state UI benefit level, conditioning on
wages. Figure shows a scatter plot of the mean residuals by state from a
regression of severance pay receipt and log maximum weekly benefit level on a
log wage spline (see text for details). Data source: Mathematica survey of UI
Exhaustees in 25 States in 1998. States with fewer than 50 individual
observations are excluded from this figure.Dependent Variable: Severance pay
Reduced-Form OLS  TSLS
No Controls With Cntrls With Cntrls
(1) (2) (3)
log max UI benefit -.074 -.065 
(0.030) (0.030)
log individual UI benefit -.105
(0.054)
Sample Size 2,996 2,733 2,733
TABLE 1
Effect of UI Benefits on Severance pay: Regression Estimates
NOTE-Specifications 1 and 2 report estimates from an OLS regression; specification 
3 reports estimates from a two-stage least squares regression using log state max 
benefit as an instrument for actual individual benefit reported in data.  Specifications 2 
and 3 include the following controls: job tenure, age, gender, household size, 
education, dropout, industry, occupation, and race dummies.